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No. 40,312. 
In the Supreme Court of Ohio 
APPEAL FROM 
THE CoURT' OF APPEALS OF CUYAHOGA CouNTY, OHIO. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TERRY, and 
RICHARD D. CHILTON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL FILED AS OF RIGHT. 
Now comes the appellee herein and moves this Court 
for an order dismissing the appeal as of right filed by the 
appellant, for the reason that no debatable constitutional 
question is involved in this case. 
JOHN T. CORRIGAN, 
Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County, 
REUBEN M. PAYNE 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
Attorneys for Appellee. 
2 
Notice of Motion. 
The appellants herein will take notice that appellee is 
filing in the Supreme Court of Ohio a motion to dismiss 
the appeal as of right by the appellants, a copy of which 
motion to dismiss is hereto attached, and that said motion 
to dismiss will be heard by the Supreme Court along with 
the motion for leave to appeal. 
JOHN T. CORRIGAN, 
Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County, 
REUBEN M. PAYNE 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
Attorneys for Appellee. 
No. 40,312. 
In the Supreme Court of Ohio 
APPEAL FROM 
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO. 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JOHN W. TERRY, and 
RICHARD D. CHILTON, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING JURISDICTION. 
1. The appellate court has not decided any question 
in a way not in accordance with applicable decisions. 
2. The appellee moves that the motions for leave to 
appeal be dismissed. 
3. The judgment of the Court of Appeals rests on an 
adequate non-constitutional basis. 
QUESTION OF LAW. 
The question of law presented by the appellant is 
taken out of context and infers a distorted impression of 
THE true and correct facts of record. 
The only question involved is whether the Court of 
Appeals was correct in affirming the trial court's over-
ruling of appellant's motion to suppress and defendants' 
judgment of conviction. 
4 
STATEMENT OF CASE. 
Detective Martin McFadden, a member of the Cleve-
land Police Department for 39 years and 4 months (R. 11) 
and assigned to the Detective Bureau for the past 35 years, 
on the 31st day of October, 1963 between 2:20 and 2:30 
p.m. while on duty in the Cleveland downtown area at the 
intersection of Huron Road, Euclid Avenue and East 13th 
Street, observed two men (the defendants in this case). 
Upon observing these two men, for the metaphysical rea-
son called a "hunch," the officer decided to position him-
self in the doorway of Rogo:ff's Store and further observe 
them. He continued to do so for some 10 or 12 minutes 
and their conduct was this: One would remain at the 
corner, the other would walk up Huron Road a short way 
and peer into either the Diamond Store or the United Air 
Lines office, look up and down the street, return to his 
companion, have a short conversation, whereupon his com-
panion would indulge in the same course of conduct while 
the first one remained on the corner. This conduct was 
repeated two to four times respectively by each of the men 
prior to their being joined by a third party. All three 
engaged in a short conversation, whereupon the third party 
departed and took a position across the street; the two men 
resumed their pattern of conduct previously described, 
each making four to six trips. Det. McFadden testified, "In 
the first place I didn't like their actions on Huron Road, 
and I suspected them of casing a job, a stickup, that's the 
reason" (R. 42). 
The two men then proceeded west on Euclid and at 
1120 Euclid they encountered the third male who had 
spoken with them previously. All three were standing 
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there conversing when Detective McFadden approached, 
identified himself as a police officer, asked them their 
names. A mumbled, incoherent response was made by one 
or all (R. 28). Thereupon the officer took hold of one of 
the men, later identified as Terry, turned him around in 
front of the officer and facing the other two. He then patted 
Terry, the man in front of him. At no time did his hands 
reach into any of the men's pockets (R. 29-30). In patting 
the defendant Terry, in the upper left pocket of the top 
coat the officerfelt a gun (R. 29). 
At this time all three men were ordered from the 
street to the interior of a nearby store. All were ordered 
to place the palms of their hands against the wall. Detec-
tive McFadden had the defendant Terry by the collar of his 
coat when they reached the interior of the store, and after 
ordering them to place their hands upon the wall, pulled 
the coat from the shoulder of Terry. A loaded revolver 
was exposed in the upper left inside coat pocket and was 
removed by Detective McFadden. The officer then pro-
ceeded to the defendant Chilton, and in patting on the out-
side of his clothing, felt an object in the left overcoat pocket 
which felt like a gun. He removed the object which turned 
out to be a loaded revolver. The third party was patted 
in the same manner, no items being found. 
All three were conveyed to Central Police Station 
and booked under Suspicious Person Warrants. 
,. :,..' 
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CHRONOLOGY. 
Subsequently, Terry and Chilton were charged with 
the offense of carrying concealed weapons and the third 
man was released on signing a waiver. Separate indict-
ments were returned on December 18, 1963 against the 
two men for carrying concealed weapons. They were 
arraigned on December 23, 1963 and entered pleas of not 
guilty. Thereafter, on September 22, 1964, counsel for the 
defendants filed his motion for suppression of evidence, 
claiming illegal search and seizure. The matter came on 
for hearing on September 22, 1964, at which time it was 
stipulated by counsel for defendants and the state that for 
purpose of hearing the motion to suppress, the two cases 
be consolidated and it was so ordered by the court. Testi-
mony was then taken. 
The trial court on September 22, 1964 in overruling 
defendants' motion to suppress and subsequently finding 
them guilty on October 2, 1964 of the charge of carrying 
concealed weapons, set forth a memorandum opinion. 
Thereafter these judgments were affirmed by the 
Court of Appeals, Eighth Judicial District of Ohio, Cuya-
hoga County, on May 25, 1966. The Court of Appeals pub-
lished this opinion in conjunction with the affirmance of 
these convictions and the same is reported as State v. 
Terry, 5 0. App. 2d 122. These judgments were ordered 
into execution May 25, 1966. 
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ARGUMENT AND LAW. 
Appellee contends: 
(1) That the appellants were indicted and convicted 
of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, Section 
2923.01 of the Ohio Revised Code; 
(2) That prior to trial appellants moved the court to 
suppress as a product of claimed illegal search and seizure, 
certain properties seized, which arrest and seizure the trial 
court upheld as being constitutional; 
(3) That the court properly denied appellants' motion 
to suppress upon hearing of the same; 
( 4) That while the question of law presented is one of 
public importance, the decision by the Court of Appeals 
was correct and should be affirmed. 
The trial court, in overruling defendants' motions to 
suppress, rendered a memorandum. opinion (Appellants' 
Appendix C) in which he expressed the hope that coun-
sel will have the question determined by the appellate 
courts. 
The issues and the applicable law are so thoroughly 
discussed in the opinion of the Court of Appeals ( 5 0. S. 
2d 122) (Appellants' Appendix F), that further argu-
ment on the points decided is not required in this brief. 
Notwithstanding that opinion, defendants erroneously in-
terpret the facts and evidence of record in their argument. 
They infer that the arrest was actually made before the 
officers frisked the men. They infer that the trial court 
found that the arrest was not legal The Court of Appeals, 
in dealing with the same erroneous inferences, had this to 
say: 
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"The appellant contends, however, that in the in-
stant case, despite a right of inquiry, the arrest took 
place the moment the defendant was questioned by 
the detective. According to his argument, since the 
arrest took place at the time of the initial inquiry, 
there was at that time no adequate 'reasonable 
grounds' to arrest and therefore under the exclu-
sionary rule of Mapp vs. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), 
the evidence must be suppressed. In support of this 
the defendant appellant's brief states: 'Since the police 
officers in this case did not conduct any interrogation 
of the defendant and his companions other than an 
inquiry of their names * * * his purpose was to ar-
rest and not to interrogate.' 
A principal cause of the difficulty here is the am-
biguous nature of the word 'arrest.' Some courts have 
used the term 'arrest' to signify the mere act of stop-
ping or restraining a person. But the term 'arrest' 
is more commonly used in the technical criminal law 
sense as the seizure of an alleged offender to answer 
for a crime. Note, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 1093, 1096 
(1964); Commonwealth v. Lehan, 347 Mass. 197 
(1964). The cases decided by the United States Supreme
preme Court appear to have adopted this latter usage, 
see Carroll vs. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 136 
(1925); Brinegar vs. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 163 
(1949), and it is the usage that has been adopted by 
the courts of Ohio. In 5 Ohio Jurisprudence (2d), Ar-
rest, Sec. 3, p. 19, 'arrest' is defined as follows: 
'An arrest as the term is used in criminal law sig-
nifies the apprehension or detention of the person 
of another in order that he may be forthcoming to 
answer an alleged or supposed crime.' 
Similarly, in State vs. Milam, 108 Ohio App. 254, 268 
(1959), this court quoted with approval the follow-
ing definition of arrest: 
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'To constitute an "arrest," four requisites are in-
volved: A purpose to take the person into custody 
of the law, under real or pretended authority and 
an actual or constructive seizure or detention of 
his person, so understood by the personarrested.' 
It is readily apparent that a required element of 
an arrest is the intent of the officer to arrest. United 
States vs. Bonanno, supra, at 81-83. In the instant 
case, when the detective approached the defendant, 
he had, as shown by uncontradicted testimony, no in-
tention at all to arrest, but only to inquire as to the 
defendant's activities. As stated in the record: 
'Q. You observed these men for some ten to 
twelve minutes? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You observed the mode of conduct that you 
have described to us? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Did you, sir, as a police officer consider that 
you should investigate it? 
A. I sure did. 
* * * 
Q. * * * after they left the corner and you ob-
served them again in front of * * * (the store 
where the three men met) * * * what did you do? 
A. I stopped them and went over and talked 
to them.' 
As to the exact time when the arrest took place, 
the record shows: 
'Q. Then in this situation you considered them 
to be under arrest when you ordered the store peo-
ple to call for the wagon? 
A. That's right.' 
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The defendants, however, contend that the case 
of Henry vs. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), estab-
lishes the point that the arrest in the instant case took 
place the moment the defendant was stopped by the 
detective. However, in the Henry case, the govern-
ment conceded in the lower courts, see 259 F. (2d) 
725 (7th Cir. 1958), and adhered to the concession 
before the Supreme Court, that the 'arrest' occurred 
the moment the car in which Henry was riding was 
stopped by the federal agents. The Supreme Court in 
its opinion stated: 
'The prosecution conceded below, and adheres to 
that concession here, that the arrest took place 
when the federal agents stopped' the car. This is 
our view of the facts of this particular case.' 361 
U.S. at 103. 
When the opinion in Henry is read in light of this 
concession, it is apparent that the court was only de-
ciding that, in the circumstances of that case, there 
was no probable cause to justify an 'arrest' at the time 
the car in which Henry was riding was stopped. See, 
United States vs. Bonanno, supra, at p. 85; Busby vs. 
United States, supra. Therefore, we hold that, in the 
instant case, the actual arrest did not occur until the 
defendant was ordered into the store after the loaded 
gun was discovered concealed on his person; Cf. Rios 
vs. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)." 
What the court actually said was that if the arrest had 
preceded the frisking of the defendant, such arrest would 
then have been illegal. The trial court and the Court of 
Appeals both determined that there is a distinction be-
tween stopping and frisking and search and seizure and 
both the trial and appellate court determined that in this 
case the arrest followed and was the result of a frisking 
operation and was made upon probable cause. 
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Defendants' argument ignores the suspicious conduct 
observed by the officers, ignores the officer's testimony of 
39 years of police experience, ignores the officer's testi-
mony that in his judgment they were "casing" an estab-
lishment for a holdup. The argument ignores the testi-
mony of the officer that he identified himself as a police 
officer before asking them questions, it ignores the 
mumbled, incoherent response· given by the defendants 
when they were asked their names, ignores the frisking 
procedure and the officer's testimony that in his judg-
ment they were casing an establishment for a holdup and 
he wanted to determine if they had guns, ignores the testi-
mony of the officer that he frisked and felt a hard object, 
which object, based on his 39 years of police experience, 
hehe concluded was a gun. The argument ignores the fact 
that even then, no search or entrance was made into the 
pockets of the defendant. The officer, retaining one de-
fendant by the collar and arm, ordered the others inside 
the store and commanded them to place their hands on 
the wall. The back of the coat collar was then pulled down 
to the defendant's arms and there exposed was the ob-
ject felt by the officer, the gun, as he had so previously 
determined based on his 39 years of experience. They 
continue to ignore the fact that the possession of the gun 
discovered by the frisking operation coupled with the other 
conduct observed by the officer prior thereto, furnished 
the probable cause for the officer to arrest the man and 
consequently the subsequent search was legal. Had the 
officer found nothing when he frisked the man, then and 
only then would there have been no grounds for the sub-
sequent arrest. It is quite clear, and the facts of the record 
are set forth, that the manifest intention of the officer was 
to interrogate and not to arrest. 
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Defendants' argument of after-the-event justification. 
In this connection two points should be noted: defend-
ants have inserted a portion of the testimony from the 
record out of context that would appear to infer after-the-
event justification. A reading of the entire record and the 
:finding of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals 
obviously refute such an inference and argument on the 
part. of the defendants. The police officer had observed 
strange, suspicious conduct of three men, which conduct 
led him to believe that a holdup was imminent. A basic 
moral obligation as a police officer dictated that he make an 
inquiry. Upon doing so he received incoherent, mumbled 
responses. The sum total of all that had transpired up to 
this point was sufficient probable cause for the officer's 
next move of "frisking" for his own protection. Upon his 
frisking and feeling the bulge, 39 years of police ex-
perience forcedthis officer to conclude that the defendant 
was armed and carrying a concealed weapon and thereby 
was committing a felony in the presence of the officer. The 
aggregate facts and knowledge now possessed by the of-
ficer give rise to probable cause for the valid arrest which 
followed. 
The Court of Appeals has held that such arrest was 
a valid arrest and that even if the arrest took place as ap-
pellant contends, it does not necessarily follow that this 
evidence must be suppressed. The opinion discusses the 
reason for the imposition of the Mapp exclusionary rule 
upon the States and the necessity for developing workable
able rules" governing arrests, searches and seizures, to 
meet the practicable demands of effective criminal investi-
gation and law enforcement, provided these rules do not 
violate the constitutional proscriptions against unreason-
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able searches and the concomitant command that evidence 
so seized is inadmissible against one who is standing to 
complain. The opinion wisely concludes that the neces-
sity of law enforcement in large urban areas requires the 
procedures utilized in the instant case. 
Finally, defendant labels the distinction between a 
frisk and a search as contained in the opinions of the trial 
and appellate court as "semantic gymnastics," and again 
attempts to equate a search which produces narcotics or 
policy slips with a frisk for a dangerous weapon. Com-
mon sense, in the interest of society, repels such a con-
clusion. 
"The business of the police is to prevent· crime if 
they can. Prompt inquiry into suspicious or unusual 
street action is an indispensable police power in the 
orderly government of large urban communities. It is 
a prime function of city police to be alert to things 
going wrong in the streets; if they were to be denied 
the right of such summary inquiry, a normal power 
and a necessary duty would be closed off." 
People v. Rivera (7 (7/10/64, N. Y. Court of Ap-
peals, U.S. Law Week, July 28, Vol. 33 #4.) 
At this point the distinction made by the trial court 
comes into this case. The decisions in White v. U. S., 271 
F. 2d 829 (1959) ; U. S. v. Hahmn, 163 F. Supp. 4 (1958), 
and the decision in the Mapp case will not outlaw a state 
officer's frisking or even a search of the person made 
prior to arrest. Under the Uniform Arrest Act adopted 
with modifications in Delaware, New Hampshire, and 
Rhode Island, "the police officer may search for a danger-
ous weapon any person whom he has stopped or detained 
to question as provided in Section 2. Whenever he has 
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reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the 
person possesses a dangerous weapon, if the officer finds a 
weapon he may take and keep it until the completion of 
the questioning when he shall either return it or arrest 
the person." The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. Law Re-
view 315 at 344 (1942). If we recognize the authority of 
the police to stop a person and inquire concerning unusual 
street events we are required to recognize the hazards in-
volved in this kind of public duty. The answer to the 
question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet; 
in any case, the exposure to danger could be great. The 
frisk is a reasonable and constitutionally permissible pre-
caution to minimize that danger. We ought not, in deciding 
what is reasonable, close our eyes to the actualities of 
street dangers in performing this kind of public duty for 
the protection of society. 
CONCLUSION. 
The trial court properly found that there is a distinc-
tion between a frisk and a search, and that in the circum-
stances of this case the frisk preceded the arrest, and 
further, that the arrest and search in connection there-
with were legal. The opinion of the Court of Appeals and 
the authorities cited therein support that conclusion. The 
defendant has not shown any valid reason why these find-
ings should be disturbed. The motion for leave to appeal 
should therefore be overruled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN T. CORRIGAN, 
Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County, 
REUBEN M. PAYNE, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 
Attorneys for Appellee. 
